Governmental hostility |
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In democratic countries, people elect governments among programs and candidates proposed by different parties. The elected government is then separate from the other powers in the state, i.e. the parliament and the justice system.
In transition countries, this system works only partially. Often the same party who wins the elections has also a majority in parliament, or controls a huge state owned economic sector, which in turn sometimes controls economically all or nearly all medias. This can lead to important distortions in the electoral campaigns. When economic power is concentrated in the same few hands which control political power, the justice system often doesn't stay independent for too long either.
Power concentration in few hands is then slowly leading to a situation of generalised clientelism.
The clientelistic mode of distribution of money and opportunities of any kind is based upon - and reinforces - governments who don't represent the interests of the people who elected them, but those of the influent and rich. Clientelistic relationships insure that such governments can control the entire country. It is quite efficient in poor countries, but it depends upon the political and economic elite being the only one who can offer opportunities. The elite has to be able to deny opportunities and leave out people and groups who are critical, or grow too popular, or are so poor that they offer no profit perspective.
External aid to the civil society is endangering this system. Independent groups suddenly have internet access even if they continue to be critical. They can afford to rent a little office, where they can be reached. They can afford a lawyer to defend the rights of the poor.
Empowerment of different civil society groups leads to a pluralism of power. Pluralism is poison for clientelistic regimes. Such governments tend to say that civil society ruins economic growth or that external help must pass through government's hands.
Such an attitude is less and less accepted internationally.
So currently there are governments who adopt a different strategy. They construct a second, artificial „civil society“, indirectly financed by the government. This second „civil society“ receives so much money, that after a time they look more professional than the genuine one.
The fact that the artificial civil society is made of groups with virtually no ideals and no activity of their own made them easy to be detected by experienced foreign development experts. So those governments have gone one step further. In fact it is easy to collect the goals and priorities of the donor organisations from their internet sites and their brochures and to compile virtual goals and programmes.
This is a type of hostile behaviour which doesn't attempt to silence civil society by arresting its members or kick them out of their jobs. Its purpose is to channel relevant external help away from them. A side effect is that with these resources loyal persons and groups can be rewarded.
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